

THE  
PSYCHOLOGICAL BULLETIN

---

SOCIAL CONSCIOUSNESS AND THE CONSCIOUSNESS  
OF MEANING.

BY PROFESSOR GEORGE H. MEAD,

*University of Chicago.*

In an earlier publication <sup>1</sup> I have supported the position that gestures in their original forms are the first overt phases in social acts, a social act being one in which one individual serves in his action as a stimulus to a response from another individual. The adaptation of these individuals to each other implies that their conduct calls out appropriate and valuable responses from each other. Such adjustment on the part of each form to the action of the other naturally leads to the direction of the action of the one form by the earliest phases of the conduct of the other. The more perfect the adaptation of the conduct of a social form the more readily it would be able to determine its actions by the first indications of an act in another form. From such a situation there follows a peculiar importance attaching to these earlier stages of social acts, serving as they do to mediate the appropriate responses of other forms in the same group. The earlier stages in social acts involve all the beginnings of hostility, wooing and parental care, all the control of the sense-organs which precede the overt conduct directed by the sense-organ, the attitudes of the body expressing readiness to act and the direction which the act will take, and finally the vasomotor preparations for action, such as the flushing of the blood-vessels, the change in the rhythm of breathing and the explosive sounds which accompany the change in the breathing rhythm and circulation.

All of these early stages in animal reaction are of supreme importance as stimuli to social forms — *i. e.*, forms whose lives are conditioned by the conduct of other forms — and must become in the

<sup>1</sup> PSYCHOLOGICAL BULLETIN, VI, 401.

process of evolution peculiarly effective as stimuli, or, put the other way around, social forms must become peculiarly sensitive to these earliest overt phases in social acts. The import which these early stages in social acts have is a sufficient explanation for their preservation even though some of them may have lost their original function in the social act. The gesture as the beginning of a social activity has become provocative of a certain response on the part of another form. It serves in wooing and quarreling to produce a summation of stimuli for reproductive and hostile reactions. This interplay of preliminary and preparatory processes even in the conduct of animal forms lower than man places the animals en rapport with each other, and leads in wooing, quarreling, and animal-play to relatively independent activities that answer to human intercourse.

There exists thus a field of conduct even among animals below man, which in its nature may be classed as gesture. It consists of the beginnings of those actions which call out instinctive responses from other forms. And these beginnings of acts call out responses which lead to readjustments of acts which have been commenced, and these readjustments lead to still other beginnings of response which again call out still other readjustments. Thus there is a conversation of gesture, a field of palaver within the social conduct of animals. Again the movements which constitute this field of conduct are themselves not the complete acts which they start out to become. They are the glance of the eye that is the beginning of the spring or the flight, the attitude of body with which the spring or flight commences, the growl, or cry, or snarl with which the respiration adjusts itself to oncoming struggle, and they all change with the answering attitudes, glances of the eye, growls and snarls which are the beginnings of the actions which they themselves arouse.

Back of these manifestations lie the emotions which the checking of the acts inevitably arouse. Fear, anger, lust of hunger and sex, all the gamut of emotions arise back of the activities of fighting, and feeding, and reproduction, because these activities are for the moment stopped in the process of readjustment. While these gestures thus reveal emotion to the observer, their function is not that of revealing or expressing emotion. While the very checking of activity and eagerness, straining to adjust oneself to indications of action on the part of the other individual, imply excess of energy seeking outlet, the setting free of surplus energy is not the function of the gesture. Nor yet is it an adequate explanation to find in the gesture the psycho-physical counterpart of the emotional consciousness. The first func-

tion of the gesture is the mutual adjustment of changing social response to changing social stimulation, when stimulation and response are to be found in the first overt phases of the social acts.

I desire in this paper to emphasize and elaborate the position taken earlier that only in the relation of this mutual adjustment of social stimulation and response to the activities which they ultimately mediate, can the consciousness of meaning arise.

It is the assumption of the author that the consciousness of meaning consists mainly in a consciousness of attitude, on the part of the individual, over against the object to which he is about to react. The feeling of attitude represents the coördination between the process of stimulation and that of response when this is properly mediated. The feelings of readiness to take up or read a book, to spring over a ditch, to hurl a stone, are the stuff out of which arises a sense of the meaning of the book, the ditch, the stone. Professor Royce has perhaps given the most simple and convincing statement of the doctrine, in his *Psychology*.

It is important to thus identify the sense of meaning with the consciousness of response or readiness to respond, because such an identification throws some light on the conditions under which the sense of meaning can arise. The power of distinguishing clearly the different elements in contents of consciousness belongs peculiarly to the field of stimulation and its imagery. Such sharp distinction of contents is not characteristic of the consciousness of response.

Vision with its assimilated imagery of contact sensation readily distinguishes the form, shadings, and colors of a rock, and can mark the different areas of color and brightness, the changing curve of line and plane, but the tendencies to react to each of these different stimulations lie back in a field into which we can only indirectly introduce clear distinctions of content. We may detect a tendency of the eye to follow the curving line and to arrest its movement with its breaks in the contour. We may catch the finger in a readiness to follow a like path, or we may be unable to analyze out these contents, and these are but a minimal fraction of the responses which are indicated in our sense of familiarity with the boulder.

The motor imagery which lies in the background of the sensuous discriminations is notably difficult to detect, and even when consciously aroused, to differentiate into clearly distinguishable parts. This difficulty in presenting the contents of response — either in terms of the attitude of body, the position of the limbs, feel of contracting muscles, or in terms of the memory of past responses — indicates that

these contents, at least in their analyzed elements, are of negligible importance in the economy of immediate conduct. On the contrary, conduct is controlled by recognized differences in the field of stimulation. It is the difference in the visual or auditory or tactual experience which results in changed response. It is the failure to secure a difference in these fields that leads to renewed effort. We are conscious of muscular strain to some degree, but attention follows the changing objects about us that register the success or failure of the activity. It is further true that the more perfect the adjustment between the stimulation and response within the act the less conscious are we of the response itself. Of incomplete adjustment we are aware as awkwardness of movement and uncontrolled reactions. Perfection of adjustment leaves us with only the recognition of the sensuous characteristics of the objects about, and we have only the attitude of familiarity to record the readiness to make a thousand responses to distinctions of vision, sound and feel that lie in our field of stimulation. Yet the meaning of these distinctions in sense experience must lie in the relation of the stimulation to the response.

The recurrence in memory of the past experience is the content that is commonly supposed to mediate this consciousness of meaning. The burnt child avoids the fire. Something to be shunned has become to him the most important element of the fascinating flame, and it is the *consequence* of the response that is supposed to give the child the all-important content. The recurrence of the imagery of the past disaster insures the avoidance of the flame. Does it give the child a consciousness that this is the meaning of the fire? There is wide difference between merging the memory of the past experience with the present sensuous stimulation leading to the withdrawal of the child's hand, and a consciousness that hot fire *means* withdrawal. In the first case an immediate content of sensation assimilates a content of imagery that insures a certain response. This assimilation in no sense guarantees a consciousness of a distinguishable meaning. As indicated above the more complete the assimilation the less conscious are we of the actual content of response. That with which we are most familiar is least likely to be distinguished in direct conduct in terms of meaning. That this familiarity is still a guarantee that upon demand we can give a meaning illustrates the point I desire to make, that the bringing into consciousness of a meaning content is an act which must in every instance be distinguished from the mere consciousness of stimulation resulting in response. To see one's hat may at once lead to picking it up and putting it on. This sureness and

immediacy of action is not the same as the consciousness that it is his hat. In fact it is essential to the economy of our conduct that the connection between stimulation and response should become habitual and should sink below the threshold of consciousness. Furthermore if the relation between stimulation and response is to appear as the meaning of the object, — if the characters of the stimulation are to be referred to the appropriate characters in response, we find ourselves before the difficulty presented above. There is in our response so little content which can be distinguished and related to the characters in the content of stimulation. There is the leaping flame which means to the child a plaything, there is heat which means a burn. In this case the results of the past responses are related to characters in the content of stimulation — movement means plaything, heat means burn. Still the meaning of plaything is playing and the meaning of burn is drawing back the hand. The association of these contents with the dancing flame does not enable the child to present to himself the playing or hurried withdrawal. It simply gives other contents, other stimulation values to his immediate experience. The association of one content with another content is not the symbolism of meaning. In the consciousness, of meaning the symbol and that which is symbolized — the thing and what it means — must be presented separately. Association of contents of stimulation tends to become a complete merging and loss of distinction. And these contents of imagery which are merged are not the attitudes, the feels of readiness to act which lie back of our consciousness of meaning. The general habit of reacting to objects of a certain class, such as a book, must be got before the mind's eye before a recognition of the meaning of a book can appear. No amount of enrichment of the sensuous content of the book through the eye, hand or memory image will bring this habitual generalized attitude into consciousness. Unquestionably these enrichments furnish us with more cues for setting off this habitual reaction. But this is their entire function, to act as cues to habitual reactions, not to appear as symbols of these reactions, as separate contents. The facility of habitual conduct forbids such separation between the stimulation-cue and the response. The more perfect the habit the less possibility would there be that the content which serves to stimulate could serve directly as the symbol of the response, could bring out separately and relate to itself the reaction for which it is responsible. If the fact be simple, consisting only in well organized stimulation and response, there cannot be found in its mechanism the occasion for the appearance of the consciousness of meaning. The perfection of adjustment between these

U of M

two parts of the act leaves no opening for the distinction between characteristic and its meaning, and without such a distinction, involved in the process of relation, there can be no recognition of meaning. Furthermore the contents in consciousness which answer to the meaning of objects are our generalized habitual responses to them. These contents are the consciousness of attitudes, of muscular tensions and the feels of readiness to act in presence of certain stimulations. There is nothing in the economy of the act itself which tends to bring these contents above the threshold, nor distinguish them as separable elements in a process of relation, such as is implied in the consciousness of meaning.

The foregoing analysis has considered only the act made perfect in habit. This act is of course the basis of the consciousness of meaning. Meaning is a statement of the relation between the characteristics in the sensuous stimulation and the responses which they call out. While therefore there is nothing in the mechanism of the act which brings this relation itself to consciousness the consciousness of the relation rests upon the perfection of the act.

If the occasion for the consciousness of meaning is not found in the habitual act may it not be found in the conflict of acts? The same psychology that states meaning in terms of the attitudes which are the registrations in consciousness of habits of reaction is wont to find in conflicting activities occasion for reflective consciousness. Thinking for this psychology is always the solution of a problem. It would then be consonant with this point of view to find in conflicting activities just that conscious distinction between the characteristic in the stimulation and the attitude of response which is the prerequisite of the consciousness of meaning. For example, a man is in doubt whether the clouds and wind mean rain or fair weather. His inclination to walk abroad, and his inclination to seek shelter are in conflict. This conflict is precisely the situation which brings sharply into consciousness the characteristics of sky and atmosphere which are signs of fair and of foul weather. A certain direction of the wind and dampness in the air are so merged in experience with the imagery of rainy weather that one instinctively draws back from expeditions far from shelter, while a still unclouded sky arouses the inclinations to wander abroad. Does this conflict which must emphasize the opposing characteristics of the morning heavens also lead to that relation of the characteristics to response which is implied in the consciousness of meaning? A legitimate guide in seeking an answer to this question will be found in the direction of attention; and attention under such

conditions is directed toward the differences in the characteristics of weather, and not toward the feels of attitude which reveal our habits of response. The man so situated studies the heavens, sniffs the air, detects a thickening of the sky which would otherwise have passed unnoticed, but does not immediately become conscious that rain means his habit of withdrawing from its inclemency, nor is he impelled to define to himself fair weather in terms of far ranging expeditions. The connections are of course there, but the conflict of tendencies directs the attention not to these connections but toward the sharper definition of the objects which constitute the stimulation.

In the field of gesture, on the other hand, the interplay of social conduct turns upon changes of attitude, upon signs of response. In themselves these signs of response become simply other stimulations to which the individual replies by means of other responses and do not at first seem to present a situation essentially different from that of the man hesitating before the uncertainties of the morning sky. The difference is found, however, in the fact that we are conscious of interpreting the gestures of others by our own responses or tendencies to respond. We awaken to the hostility of our neighbors' attitudes by the arising tendency to attack or assume the attitude of defense. We become aware of the direction of another's line of march by our tendencies to step one side or the other.

During the whole process of interaction with others we are analyzing their oncoming acts by our instinctive responses to their changes of posture and other indications of developing social acts. We have seen that the ground for this lies in the fact that social conduct must be continually readjusted after it has already commenced, because the individuals to whose conduct our own answers, are themselves constantly varying their conduct as our responses become evident. Thus our adjustments to their changing reactions take place, by a process of analysis of our own responses to their stimulations. In these social situations appear not only conflicting acts with the increased definition of elements in the stimulation, but also a consciousness of one's own attitude as an interpretation of the meaning of the social stimulus. We are conscious of our attitudes because they are responsible for the changes in the conduct of other individuals. A man's reaction toward weather conditions has no influence upon the weather itself. It is of importance for the success of his conduct that he should be conscious not of his own attitudes, of his own habits of response, but of the signs of rain or fair weather. Successful social conduct brings one into a field within which a consciousness of one's own attitudes helps toward the control of the conduct of others.

In the field of social conduct, attention is indeed directed toward the stimulation existing in the overt actions and preparations for action on the part of others, but the response to these indications of conduct leads to change in this conduct. The very attention given to stimulation may throw one's attention back upon the attitude he will assume toward the challenging attitude in another, since this attitude will change the stimulation. To make the two situations somewhat more specific we may compare the state of consciousness of a man running through a forest or over broken ground, with that of a man face to face with a number of enemies. The first is constantly faced by problems requiring rapid solution, problems of the pace he can keep up, and the direction he should take in the midst of the crowded obstacles to his progress. He responds instantaneously to indications of distance, of contour, and of resistance by rapid movements toward which as attitudes he has not the slightest temptation to turn his attention.

The second is subject to the same type of stimulation. He must act instantaneously and judge as quickly the characters of the stimulations to which he must respond. His situation however differs in this, that the attitude he assumes to meet an anticipated blow may lead his opponent to change the attack, and he must if he is to survive be aware of this value. His own gesture thus interprets his opponent's attitude and must be held in consciousness as changing the situation to which he must respond. In a word, within social conduct the feels of one's own responses become the natural objects of attention, since they interpret first of all attitudes of others which have called them out, in the second place, because they give the material in which one can state his own value as a stimulus to the conduct of others. Thus we find here the opportunity and the means for analyzing and bringing to consciousness our responses, our habits of conduct, as distinguished from the stimulations that call them out. The opportunity is found in the import of the response in determining the conduct of others. The means are our gestures as they appear in the feel of our own attitudes and movements, which are the beginnings of social reactions.

I may refer in closing to the accepted doctrine that language, in which our meanings almost exclusively arise in consciousness, is but a form — a highly specialized form — of gesture, and to the other important fact that in these presentations of others' attitudes and our own we have the material out of which selves are constructed, and to the fact that consciousness of meaning is so intimately bound up with self-consciousness.

Thus the consciousness of meaning at least at this stage is a consciousness of one's own attitudes of response as they answer to, control, and interpret the gestures of others. The elements in this consciousness are first of all a social situation, *i. e.*, stimulation by another's act with tendencies to respond revealing themselves in our own reactions, these tendencies and the stimulations which call them out mutually influencing each other; secondly, the consciousness of this value of one's own gesture in terms of the change in the gesture of the other form, *i. e.*, one is conscious of the relation between the stimulation and the response; thirdly the terms in which this relation appears in consciousness, *i. e.*, the feel of one's own attitude arising spontaneously to meet the gesture of the other, then the imagery of the change in the gesture of the other which would answer this expression, which again would arouse the tendency to respond in still different fashion. It must remain for a later paper to analyze the process of language in these terms, and to indicate the fundamental character of this consciousness of meaning in the consciousness of self, and finally to present the process of thought itself as such a play of gesture between selves, even when those selves are a part of our inner selfconsciousness.

## PSYCHOLOGICAL LITERATURE.

### RECENT LITERATURE ON SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY.

Little has been published during 1910 which belongs primarily to social psychology in the stricter sense of the term. An article which on its face raises a general question is *The Fallacy of Social Psychology* by G. C. Field in the *Hibbert Journal* for October (Vol. IX., No. 1, pp. 144-162). The 'fallacy' is the supposition that social psychology, especially as represented by McDougall, is of any use for politics as treated by Graham Wallas. As regards McDougall the difficulty is that whereas psychology classes feeling according to causes the politician is interested rather in effects. Awe in the presence of a king may be identical in origin with the fear of early man in the presence of an enemy, but the practical statesman will not treat it as the same with that fear. Such generalizations as that if the reproductive instinct should die out the race would not continue are fairly obvious without the authority of social psychology. Not a single political truth of importance has social psychology taught us. For political purposes the need is to know how people will act in a particular case under existing conditions, and this is entirely a matter of experience, not scientific analysis of the different emotions. At this point Mr. Field changes the line of attack: granting that, as Graham Wallas maintains, political theory has been guilty of the intellectualist fallacy, and that in reality people in politics are more influenced through the emotions than through the intellect, this is no reason for appealing to their emotions. The important thing is to intellectualize emotional appeals. In order to have guidance for our political action we need political philosophy rather than social psychology. It may doubtless be granted to Mr. Field that social psychology is not a substitute for ethics, and it is further quite obvious that an experienced politician could make shrewder forecasts in most cases than a psychologist as to the popular will. Even so there were logical reasoners before Aristotle and excellent teachers before educational psychology was written. Yet in spite of much elaboration of the obvious there has somehow come into education a more sympathetic attitude — an appreciation of the child's individuality and point of view — and this is probably due largely to the study of psy-

chology. In analogous fashion we may expect that social psychology will gradually make the other man's point of view and emotional attitudes more intelligible. And if study of the 'causes' of feelings does this it is certainly not futile. To treat the other man, not merely as a pipe to be played upon, nor on the other hand as merely different and therefore as inexplicable, if not stupid, — this is indispensable for a working faith in democracy. And, as such, it is not to be ignored as a factor in our political philosophy.

The value of social psychology in comprehending and aiding the moral and spiritual life is emphatically recognized by Dr. Stanton Coit in his brochure, *The Spiritual Nature of Man* (The West London Ethical Society, Queen's Road, Bayswater. Pp. 112. 1 shilling). The power and value of association and coöperation have been most fully realized in religious societies, but this need not be interpreted in a supranaturalistic way. As Clifford put it, "It is ourself, not ourselves that makes for righteousness." This group-spirit is present 'when two or three are gathered together.' It is more effective with a larger number. Spiritual communion is a fact. One set of interpreters have treated it as miracle; and this has led their critics to deny or ignore it altogether. If attention were fixed on the facts of this communion and coöperation, and if the laws under which it may be most effectively and rationally developed were studied there would be a great gain in the effectiveness of moral agencies. There is no such thing in the life of an individual as a 'spontaneous generation' of moral insight and character. "So far as we have any experience moral life is always generated from precedent moral life." To understand the conditions under which the most helpful psychic environment can be produced and maintained is a most important aim of scientific study.

Diametrically opposed to this doctrine of the responsiveness of human nature to a psychic environment is *The Duty of Altruism* by Ray Madding McConnell (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1910. Pp. 255. \$1.50 net). For although in one passage Baldwin's account of the genesis of the moral consciousness is approved, the central doctrine is that the moral consciousness is a purely individual affair, untouched by any influence, least of all, by any rational influence. "Differences of character are inborn and unchangeable. The bad man is bad from birth" (p. 197). This is a corollary of Dr McConnell's psychology of the will. "Intelligence is accessory to will and is without moral significance, except as it enables the will better to accomplish itself." The will is thus conceived, as by Schopenhauer,

as a *Ding an sich*, shut off absolutely from any formative influence of an intellectual sort. It is indeed given a genesis according to the laws of biological evolution: The 'good will' "is a natural product, developed in a way which we name 'natural evolution.' A 'good' will or a 'bad' will is as wholly a *natural* and necessary phenomenon as the nature and development of an animal or plant." From these premises the conclusion is obvious that there is no 'duty' as to ends. "The zoölogist does not 'prescribe.' He does not approach a pig and say, you ought to become a goat; nor does he go to a particular kind of pig and say, you ought to become a different kind of pig. With what reason does the moralist approach a particular kind of man and say you ought to become a different kind of man?" (p. 197). The author sees no alternative between accepting "the individual as the ultimate fact" and claiming "for some imperative an absolute value imposing itself without condition or justification." This last quotation well illustrates the author's general tendency. His categories are so fixed, his divisions, *e. g.*, between intellect and will, between liberty and necessity, between individual and social, are so water-tight, that there is no room for any facts which do not easily lend themselves to such isolation. Commenting on the supposed absurdity involved in the sentence, "I have the ability to modify my character," he says, "the 'I' is itself 'my character,'" and exclaims, "Have I two characters, one acting and one acted upon?" Precisely, one might reply, so long as 'I' am still in the making, so long as I exist in my ideals as truly as in my past deeds. It is for this very reason that the function of the moral reformer is not just that of the zoölogist who classifies pigs and goats. True it is that values, and in particular the value or duty of altruism, cannot be demonstrated to absolutely egoistic beings, and that the individual will must recognize the value or the duty before it is for that person binding. It does not follow that the 'individual will' remains 'individual' during the process of recognition. It may be that just in the adoption of such a value it remakes itself and becomes more and more social. And if we seek the causes which lead to such building up of social character we shall find—the social psychologist believes—social influences at work, and an activity of thought which is as truly an integrant factor in the completed will as is the other factor, *viz.*, impulse and feeling.

In *Le Sens de L'Histoire* (Paris: Alcan, 1910. Pp. 429) Max Nordau first criticizes various conceptions of history which see in it some purpose in process of realization, and likewise authors like Marx, who though on the right track in viewing it as caused by human needs

yet conceive these needs too narrowly. The question how history can be treated in order that it may be more than a series of incidents, and may be in some sense the study of humanity is then considered. The key to such a study must lie in psychology. But neither the psychology of the crowd (collective psychology), nor that of races and peoples, has any basis for existence. Collective bodies are only the sum of individuals. If these latter act differently when in crowds, this is no reason for a special psychology. So do men act peculiarly in presence of a volcano in eruption, but this does not require a different kind of psychology. Nor can a language express the 'soul of a people' for peoples have changed their languages, and the Latin—or its daughter tongues—is spoken by people as diverse as Spanish, Walloon, Roumanian, and Franks. Further the sources for discovering the beginning of history are not the savages of to-day. These are far from primitive. Rather we should examine the instincts which are the survivals of man's earlier life. Self-preservation and sex are fundamental. There is no proof that man is naturally gregarious. The most significant fact about man follows from his discovery that whenever existence was difficult to maintain the resistance of fellow men was less than that of nature. It was easier—for the strong—to despoil other men than to wrest from nature food, shelter, repose. The most convenient form of 'adaptation' was found to be parasitism. Almost all institutions rest on this. The consummation of parasitic achievement is in the creation of habits of thought among the exploited, which regard this process not as an injustice but as an honor. The parasitic strong—the *élites*—contribute nothing to progress. Progress is due to the men of genius who by discovery and invention make knowledge superior to parasitism as a mode of adaptation.

In *La Lutte contre le Crime* (Paris: Alcan, 1910, 6 fr.) J. -L. de Lanessan aims to discover the sources of crime in order to propose remedies. If, as even Darwin and Spencer supposed, there is an inherited moral sense, it is a simple explanation of crime to say, as some have maintained, that the criminal is defective in this endowment, or that he is atavistic. The author believes that there is no sufficient evidence that crime is due to heredity, or that there has been a certain definite type or grade of conscience common to each epoch. On the contrary, moral conceptions vary not only at successive times but also within the same period with classes, corporate groups, families, and even with individuals. To-day, for example, certain murders (*e. g.*, of an unfaithful wife, or lover) are condoned; certain kinds of stealing

(from the government in evading customs or taxes) and fraud (in adulterating goods, etc.) are practiced by those who consider themselves perfectly honest. The sole discoverable difference morally between primitive and modern peoples is that the number of moral individuals increases in the latter. No vice has disappeared from human societies, but the number of the vicious diminishes. "Observation shows that moral ideas are purely individual and that they have their source, either in the natural needs of the individual, or in the relations which he sustains to others, or in the education he receives and the examples which are afforded him."

As regards education and training children fall into three classes: (1) Those whose parents give them little or no training. Egoistic and sexual impulses are very likely to plunge such children into the criminal class. (2) Those who receive on the whole a wholesome training, though defective in certain respects. Children of peasants and working people usually respect life and property, though the former do not scruple to put water into wine, or the latter to slight their work. Children of the bourgeoisie are likely to feel the example of social competition and of striving for wealth, hence crimes of breach of trust or sharp practice are more likely to occur. (3) Those whose parents either train them to vice or by examples of drunkenness, idleness, and violence directly influence them toward a vicious life. About one fourth of the young criminals appear to come from this class. Children abnormally nervous and excitable are peculiarly in need of good education, but they are not necessarily criminal in tendency.

Age, sex, profession, cosmic and social conditions further affect criminality. It is noteworthy, for example, that in the liberal professions the number of convictions per 100,000 among notaries, advocates, lawyers, and court officers, *i. e.*, persons who deal with financial affairs, amounted to an average of 48 annually from 1898 to 1901, while among physicians it was 15, and among professors 4. Commercial pursuits furnish 28, domestic service, 18, agriculture, 8. Criminality "attains its maximum intensity during adolescence and youth, in the male sex, in the professions which make misdemeanors easy and expose their members most to alcoholism, in most populous city environments, in massings of working people of intense sort (*e. g.*, in strikes), in warm climates, and in years of scarcity, finally in periods of religious conflicts, of revolutions, and wars — that is to say when all the influences which increase the excitability of men reach their maximum of intensity."

Treatment in view of these facts should be as follows: Children

of group (3) above should be removed from their parents and educated by the state. Children whose parents cannot watch over them properly because they (the parents) are away from home at work should be cared for during the day. Finally, all minors who are brought before the courts should be placed in schools, industrial, military or naval, and kept there until the age for military service.

The author lays stress also upon his denial of 'free will,' and 'responsibility,' and consequently of the basis for 'punishment.' He does not hesitate in the same breath to insist on education for the control of impulses, which implies all that at least one doctrine of free will calls for.

Ethical rather than psychological is *La Critique du Darwinisme Social*, by J. Novicow. (Paris: Alcan, 1910. Pp. 407.) Social Darwinism is defined as "the doctrine which considers collective homicide as the cause of the progress of the human species," and although stated thus baldly the doctrine may seem unfamiliar, the author not only finds sanction for it in sociologists like Spencer, Ward, Ratzenhofer and Rénan, but affirms that few do not share it. It is the creed of those who claim to be *pratiques* and *réalistes*. The biological, anthropological, economic and political aspects of the theory are examined with much detail, but the point of chief psychological interest is the insistence that the prime factor in progress is association. Struggle is indeed general but in itself antagonism is negative and disintegrating; association is equally general and is positive. It produces intensification of life and aids in the mastery over nature which is the source of wealth. Spoliation and banditism may be dominant at certain periods, but careful analysis shows that true strength and union have come in spite of antagonism, not because of it. The general position is that of Huxley in the Romanes lecture, but the analysis and criticism is much more extensive and detailed.

Raoul de la Grasserie has collected his studies on language, several of which have been noticed from time to time in the *BULLETIN*, into a volume which has not yet been received. In the *Revue Internationale de Sociologie* for February, 1910 (XVIII., pp. 76-113), the same author considers Intolerance ('De l'intolérance comme phénomène social'). Religious, political, social, racial, sex (of man for woman), scientific, educational, literary and other forms are described with acuteness. The causes are desire for conservation of self or party, the craving by strong wills to impose themselves upon the weaker, and finally the conviction of the truth of something which we believe useful or necessary to society. Hence doubt is the strongest force for tolerance.

Two little books on language which present a great field in highly condensed form, are F. H. Frick's *Die Sprachstämme des Erdkreises*, and *Die Haupttypen des Sprachbaus* (Leipzig: Teubner, 1909. Pp. 143, 156). No psychological interpretation is attempted, except as certain fundamental characteristics of the various types of speech inevitably suggest it, *e. g.*, the suffixes in the language of the upper Zambezi, which refer almost all things spoken of to certain categories. In *Liberté de Conscience et Liberté de Science*, by Luigi Luzzati, translated from the Italian by J. Chamard (Paris: Giard et Brière, 1910. Pp. 453. 10 fr.) questions of great present interest in France are treated both historically and critically. Much of the work had previously appeared in the form of brief articles. *Rationalism et Tradition* by Jean Devolvé (Paris: Alcan, 1910. Pp. 180. 2 fr. 50) is likewise of special timeliness in France, as it is an examination of the conditions of effectiveness of a secular or rational morality. This is a pressing problem there because of the system of moral instruction in the public schools. The author believes it a mistake to attempt moral training by the methods of demonstrating and impressing duties. There should be rather the pregressive determination of a value or end already willed. He further believes that the notion of the divine may be given a naturalistic interpretation by which it may function in moral purpose.

'The Rôle of Magic,' by J. T. Shotwell (*Amer. Jour. of Sociology*, Vol. XV., pp. 781-793), as the wording suggests is more concerned with the function than with the psychology of magic. But, as against Frazer, the author regards it as inseparable historically from religion. Psychologically it is the state of feeling awakened in a man by the consciousness in and around him of mysterious powers. Objectively it is a wonderful uncanny potency set loose by various methods. Not only sacraments, but many social, legal, and political institutions depend upon this attitude. The power of priests and kings attests its influence. It is thus an important factor in the explanation of a large part of history, particularly European history.

J. H. T.

*Race and Marriage.* U. G. WEATHERLY. *Amer. Jour. of Sociology*, Vol. XV., pp. 433-453.

Aversion to cross-breeding among animals is said to be due to hereditary instinct but among humans it may be due to (a) a sense of strangeness and non-contact with other human varieties, (b) diversity of types, (c) rigidity of group forms, (d) language, religion, and social status.

The most distinctive groups are constituted by race which, in its widest sense, implies both physical and psychical unity. Within a group marriage is controlled largely by the group choices and standards which are usually such as are advantageous to the group. The esthetic sense plays a part, but not so much as the favoring of the type desired. Sentiment and sexual attraction sometimes cut across the group standards, but these are usually subordinated to the economic and social types which the contracting parties represent.

Race blending is usually unmethodical. It is most rapid where the races are plastic and without fixed prejudices. Its fecundity depends upon the degree of cultural difference between the parent stocks and absence of cultural homogeneity may account for the incapacity for type-perpetuation among the offspring of widely different stocks. Race prejudice is an effective barrier to the mingling of races. It may be acquired but rather represents what is associated in thought with undesirable cultural standards. The desire for race purity is another such barrier and is made most effective through geographical separation.

Race mongrelization is unnecessary for the most effective world-progress. The latter is best promoted if each group is allowed to preserve its type — especially in the case of the cultural races — and to assimilate from others what it can use to advantage. In world-progress varied race types are beneficial, just as varied individual traits are in smaller social units.

H. B. REED.

UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO.

*A Study in the Psychology of Ritualism.* FREDERICK GOODRICH HENKE. The University of Chicago Press, 1910. Pp. vii + 96.

This study is a suggestive application of social psychology to the important phenomena of ritualism, not only in primitive, but also in developed, religion. A wealth of concrete anthropological material is first presented, showing the close relation of ritual to the general life. Then the operation of the fundamental instincts is traced. Comparative psychology is cited as the field in which we may look for the impulses in early human society. The chief of these are food and sex, and their interplay is traced in the occupations and customs of the different sexes and in their influence upon the entire group. Two derivative instincts, fear and anger, are also discussed. It is a question whether other 'derivative' instincts, such as gregariousness, could as well be included. Such a problem throws into clearness the present

inadequacy of our psychology of instinct. The social character of these instincts is everywhere kept in view by Dr. Henke.

Another fundamental principle emphasized in this work is the place of attention in primitive ceremony. The direction of attention is accounted for in functional terms, as due to the crises of experience. "In any given instance the fortunate or satisfactory reaction is repeated when a similar occasion presents itself, and so becomes a group habit. Hallowed by custom, it becomes the prescribed method of procedure and thereby is ritualized." A chapter is given to the effect upon the ritual of changes in the social group, due to great leaders, adversity or good fortune, conquest and expansion. There are rituals which are religious and some which are not. "The religious elements are incorporated in those which are performed with the approval of the group: all others are irreligious."

It is maintained that the æsthetic interest in the ritual is dependent upon and secondary to the practical motive. Several detailed investigations of the experience of groups and individuals are cited in confirmation of this view. The survival of the ritual in modern groups is attributed to their need of it. Even the so-called non-ritualistic churches repeat the same order of services and employ the same forms of speech in prayers and addresses. "Revivalism itself has been ritualized." The author concludes with this suggestion: "As long as the rituals take such a place in the life of the group, as long as they promote the group consciousness, conserve group values, and satisfy the needs of the individuals of the group, they will survive."

E. S. AMES.

UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO.

#### PSYCHOLOGY OF RELIGION.

*The Psychology of Religious Experience.* EDWARD SCRIBNER AMES. Boston and New York: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1910. Pp. xii + 428.

The situation in the intellectual world, as regards the relations of philosophy and religion, is, to-day, one of decided interest. On the one hand scientific, historical, and philosophical criticism have accomplished their several tasks and the theological systems of an older day have been removed completely from the sphere of intelligent debate. But, on the other hand, — and to the great surprise of many — the destruction of theology has disclosed to the view of the critics a mass of religious material so imbedded in the life history of the race that they cannot avoid the task of analyzing, describing, and interpret-

ing it. In other words, the net result of criticism has been but to refine the theological dross from religion and by so doing to reveal to the curious gaze of the enquirer a new and more complex problem which challenges alike the skill of the scientist, the historian and the philosopher. As a consequence, the intelligent critic of to-day finds himself compelled by a two-fold obligation of intellectual honesty. Toward theology, in the ordinary sense of the term, his attitude is more decidedly and systematically negative than ever. To him it is demonstrably a relic of a day by-gone and outgrown. Toward the masses of religious phenomena which have been laid bare by the processes of criticism themselves, his attitude is that of a surprised but interested discoverer — for the destruction of the screen of theology has revealed a vista of racial change in which religion is inextricably interwoven with the life of society in every phase of its development. More than this, the discovery that religion is a natural phenomenon has presented a definite challenge to the critic — a challenge which he has not been able nor, apparently, has he desired to decline. As a result there has recently grown up a very considerable body of literature whose subject of consideration has been religion taken in the varied aspects of its natural character and whose method of treatment has been thoroughly critical and objective. Certain of these investigations have been made by candid enquirers thoroughly well trained and equipped but temperamentally indifferent to religion other than as a legitimate subject of specialistic research. Other investigations have been by men who have been both objective in their methods and sympathetic in their attitude to the subject-matter with which they were dealing. Now it is evident that, other things being equal, wherever a critical objective method is combined with a sympathetic attitude toward the subject-matter investigated the results obtained are certain to evince greater insight into the phenomena studied — and therefore to possess more permanent value — than those in which an indifference to the subject-matter is evident. Such an investigation combining a critical objective method with a sympathetic attitude toward the subject-matter is the one now before us. We shall find, accordingly, that it is peculiarly well-fitted to the issues of the times and that it voices the very best spirit of objective methods and of religious interest.

Taking the volume as a whole, Professor Ames's book is — as every scientific enquiry should be — most suggestive and stimulating. It brings the reader into vital contact with the subject-matter, lays bare its complexity, opens up broad and interesting views, and challenges independent judgment at every step. It does not aim at finality and in so

doing commends itself the more to one's mind. For nowadays worthful books are instruments of investigation, not mere standards of authority. We ask of authors that they have something to say and that they say it: we are little concerned that they do not say the last word, for it has been painfully borne in upon us by contrary experiences that there is no last word to anything.

Professor Ames undertakes his enquiry into the complexities of religion not in the interest of the philosophy of religion or of the history of religion but in that of the psychology of religion. In developing this interest he lays his foundations deeply and well in the broad issues of a social psychology which makes the understanding of the earlier racial experiences of religion the necessary and appropriate introduction to the study and estimate of its more individual and current phases. Thus — and apart from his historical and methodological introduction — Professor Ames investigates first, *The Origin of Religion in the Race*. Under this head he examines in a progressive, constructive manner, (*a*) the determining impulses in primitive religion, (*b*) custom and taboo, (*c*) ceremonials and magic, (*d*) spirits, (*e*) sacrifice, (*f*) prayer, (*g*) mythology, (*h*) the development of religion. Building upon the results obtained in this preliminary enquiry, the author proceeds in his next section to treat of *The Rise of Religion in the Individual*. Here he reviews and brings into correlation with his central conception of religion the psychology (*a*) of religion and childhood, (*b*) of religion and adolescence, (*c*) of normal religious development, (*d*) of conversion. Lastly, he focuses his cumulative results in a most suggestive analysis of *The Place of Religion in the Experience of the Individual and of Society*. Here he comes into concrete touch with the following questions: (*a*) religion as involving the entire psychical life, (*b*) ideas and religious experience, (*c*) feeling and religious experience, (*d*) the psychology of religious experience and inspiration, (*e*) non-religious persons, (*f*) the psychology of religious sects, (*g*) the religious consciousness in relation to democracy and science.

In his historical introduction Professor Ames presents a brief but satisfactory account of the development of interest in the psychology of religious experience. In his methodological prospectus he definitely commits himself to the point of view of functional psychology. His presupposition, therefore, as to the nature of mental life, is that it is a functional adjustment — and in higher forms the determining factor in the adjustment — of the developing organism to its environment. Cast into terms of religious experience this conception involves the working hypothesis that religion also is a method of the adaptation of human life

to its environment. Now having presupposed this much the further problem remains to make good this hypothesis through a careful and adequate examination of the materials furnished by religious facts, to define the precise character of religion, and to determine its position amid the forces of social life. With these problems, as we have seen, Professor Ames concerns himself in the body of his book.

The essential principle of religion, according to Professor Ames — as I understand him — is that it exhibits social life in constant process of bringing its activities, interests, and aims to a unity of control. In religion the ultimate focus and control center of life is to be found. It is of the essence of social life and inseparable from it. It *is* social life — in significant unity. As social organizations develop or decay the various forms of religion which are their natural expression also undergo development or decay. But, on the other hand, even as social life throughout its myriad forms has integrated its gains into a connected development, so too religion has maintained a unity of development despite its variant forms. Religion is thus as permanent as society. Again, religion is ever the focal center of social life. Whatever is of abiding significance in social life — be it what it may — ultimately takes on religious quality and becomes a dominating agent in that life. The 'spirits' of the savage, the gods of the nations, the one God of the highest religions are, one and all of them, interpretations of man's environment in terms of man's significant social needs as these have been developed, refined, and universalized through the progress of the race.

To such a view of religion no separation is to be made between the sacred and the secular — for the sacred is but the integrated unity of the secular forces of life, and the secular but the analyzed diversity of the sacred. Nor, again, is any separation to be made between the natural and the supernatural: God is the immanent world-process defined pragmatically through the development of human ideals. And it would seem that to this view — at least in principle — the psychology of religion, taken in the broad sweep of its anthropological, historical, and introspective aspects, inevitably leads.

Such, then, is Professor Ames's *Psychology of Religious Experience* — a broad, thoroughgoing, sympathetic but objective investigation of the religious life taken as a race-fact. It is not an apologetic of religion in the ordinary sense of the word: it is something much better — something which serves the interests of religion far beyond the powers of apologetic, viz., it is an understanding of religion as a necessary expression of human life focalizing in itself the dynamic,

instrumental ideals of the race. Points for debate the volume certainly furnishes even to those who find themselves in close agreement with its viewpoint, method, and results. These points the reader will readily discover for himself as it is one of the many excellencies of the book that Professor Ames is thoroughly frank. To debate them, in other than a most hurried and unsatisfactory manner, within the limits of a brief review would be impossible.

As a text-book Professor Ames's volume will be found very satisfactory. Indeed I have already found it to be so. It is clear, compact, thorough, and objective. One must agree or disagree. No shirking of the issue is possible. This in itself is invaluable for those who desire to develop in their students sound and well-balanced ideas on such an important topic as religion.

S. F. MacLENNAN.

OSBORN COLLEGE.

*Studies in Mystical Religion.* RUFUS M. JONES. London: Macmillan and Company, 1909. Pp. xxxviii + 518. \$3.50.

This notable study of Christian Mysticism is written so definitely from a psychological point of view that it may not inappropriately be classed as a contribution to the growing literature of the psychology of religion. The psychological presuppositions are stated in the introduction of thirty-eight pages and we shall here confine ourselves chiefly to that section.

In the light of many French studies and those of Coe, Leuba and to some extent James in this country, the tendency of the students of the psychology of religion has been to stress the abnormal or unusual aspects of mysticism and to explain all its phenomena as extreme types of auto-suggestion. It is a part of the purpose of this author to show that there is a sane and healthful mysticism as well as a neurotic variety, and that the former type of experience has claims upon an objective validity that may well be equal to those of any other type of conscious experience, in other words, that there *are* *stiaxmeycepl* *riences* that are pragmatically justifiable and hence have some significance as accounts of objective orders of existence. Thus he says, "The significant fact of the mystical experience is not the sense of expansion, or of freedom, or of joy. It is not something merely subjective. It is that such experiences minister to life, construct personality and conduce to the increased power of the race — *energy to live by actually does come to them from somewhere*. The universe backs the experience. . . . We have thus more to account for and explain than a few

rare, subjective experiences, a few cases of heightened feeling. We are bound to realize that mystical experiences have a life-value, and validify themselves in action."

The author begins by contrasting two tendencies often opposed in the history of religion, the one a tendency to crystallize religion in habit, custom and ceremonial and to view it as something essentially fixed and perfect from the beginning, the other the tendency to break with custom and to emphasize the side of spontaneous personal experience. He recognizes the importance of this background of habit and custom, but maintains that when extreme emphasis is placed upon that side of religion, incursions of fresh individual experience are apt to be suppressed and religion loses its vital propulsive quality. The growing, creative periods of religion have always been characterized by an unusual richness in this contribution of new experiences from individuals. It is in these vital original experiences, rather than in the formalism of custom and tradition that we find the essence of religion and, we presume the author would say, its origin as well. This, in general, suggests the conception of mysticism that underlies the work. It is "a type of religion which is primarily grounded in experience . . . *which puts emphasis upon immediate awareness of relation with God.*" As a psychical phenomenon, it has its analogue in all those experiences, whether religious or not, in which one feels that the "meaning, the significance, the richness of life, vastly transcends concepts or descriptions." This superiority of existence to all descriptive phrases is a commonplace of psychology and philosophy. At times we seem to feel in a very striking way the larger meaning of life, the broader and deeper capacities of our being. These moments of completer living, of superior insight are responsible for much that is of worth in literature, art, and in fact in all forms of human occupation. Moreover, all these experiences of inspiration, of penetrating vision cannot be condemned as the expression of a neurotic temperament. They come to "persons seemingly as normal as the sanest tiller of the soil." Professor Jones does not, then, regard this type of experience as necessarily pathological, even though it is not an everyday commonplace. That there are mystical experiences which "often do pass over the border line of normality," he freely admits. It seems to the reviewer that the author deserves great credit for his emphasis upon the non-pathological aspects of mystical experience and also for his reserve in accepting as scientifically valid the interpretation placed by the mystic upon his own experiences. "Does this sort of subjective experience furnish empirical evidence of God?" His

answer is that "no empirical experience of any sort can ever answer that question." To the mystic the experience may seem to be one of divine illumination and of union with God, it may seem to call for no other proof than the experience itself. To say, however, that this rise "to new levels of life, power, and service" is due to auto-suggestion, is only "to substitute one word for another." It is, in other words, quite legitimate to describe the mystic's experiences in the terminology of psychology, but that does not prove that they are not in some deep sense just what the mystic feels them to be. It is at least a scientifically observable fact that "we have on our hands experiences which have opened to individuals and to the race as a whole wider realms of being, experiences which have heightened the quality of life and which have given new energy of survival." This fact demands either an extension of our meaning of personality or a recognition of the claims of the mystic "that the personal self is bosomed in a larger realm of consciousness." To the reviewer it seems that in either case there is a symbolism that is convertible the one into the other. Both sorts of symbols are but attempts to state in some sort of usable, tangible form the generally recognized fact that conscious selfhood has a largeness about it, a meaning, a richness that defies all exact description.

It is the vivid appreciation of life that has been the wellspring of *all* religion. An appreciation that is not of necessity passive contemplation but one which runs readily and naturally over into social service. On the background of this psychological analysis and of this appreciation of mysticism, Professor Jones traces an almost unbroken chain of mystical religion from primitive Christianity to the close of the English Commonwealth. The important aspects of medieval mysticism are treated fully and very suggestively, leading on to the discussion of the prereformation in England, the Anabaptists, the Family of Love, the Seekers, and the Ranters, and lastly of later individual mystics. As a whole this book furnishes an introduction to a series of volumes which will deal with the Society of Friends, an organization "which has made a serious attempt to unite immediate mystical religion with active social endeavors."

The book is a significant contribution to the growing literature of the history of religion written primarily from a psychological viewpoint.

IRVING KING.

STATE UNIVERSITY OF IOWA.

*The Child and His Religion.* GEORGE E. DAWSON. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1909. Pp. ix + 124. \$.82.

The main feature of this little volume is the reprint as one of its chapters of a study, published in the *Pedagogical Seminary* some ten years ago, entitled 'Children's Interest in the Bible.' Loosely connected with it are three other chapters, 'Interest as a Measure of Values,' 'The Natural Religion of Children,' and 'The Problem of Religious Education.'

In the first chapter it is maintained that the doctrine of interest applies as fully in religious as in secular education. In the next chapter the author holds that the child is naturally religious and that religious education is therefore merely the natural unfolding of his inner nature. His point of view is metaphysical rather than scientific and psychological. For example he holds that science is and always has been essentially religious because its 'field of work is nature' which is in turn the expression of God. In striving to discover unity and law in nature, science is but 'engaged in a quest for God.' Man in particular reveals in his make-up of instincts and fundamental processes his religious nature. The reviewer, even though of religious inclinations, cannot feel that there is any force in such an argument. The points of view of science and of religion are different, the one having to do with description and the other with valuation, so that science can hardly be regarded as 'from the beginning implicitly religious.'

The natural religion of the child is based upon his supposed animism, his instinct for causality and his instinct for immortality. In view of the fact that there is an increasing feeling among anthropologists that animism is not in any sense a religion nor can be taken as the basis for a religion, the argument loses much of its force.

There are apparently then two fundamental defects in the argument: First the evidence is not convincing that there is a genuine instinct either of animism or of immortality in the child and even if there were they could not be held as contributing in any preëminent way to the religious life. If animism, as such, among primitive peoples is not religious, neither would an animistic view of the world on the part of the child have religious significance. The illustrations of the animism of the child which are here submitted bear no clear resemblance to the animism which is known among primitive peoples. The child's interest in discovering causes may lead him to make inquiries as to the ultimate cause of the world and life, but here again we have nothing that is in the nature of religion. The truth of the

matter is that religion is an appreciative rather than an explanatory attitude and all the aspects of the personality may contribute toward the development of this life of appreciation. The entire child is raw material for the development of a religious nature; it is a fallacy to look for its roots in some special instincts. That this life of values is not shut out from even the child is brought out by the author at the close of the chapter in the excellent section dealing with faith and good will. It is upon these qualities, the fruitage of his entire nature, that the religious nature of the child rests rather than upon any instinct to feel 'the spiritual quality of things and forces' or to postulate a 'personal intelligent cause back of the phenomena of the world.' These are only accidents of religion, not its essence.

The last section dealing with the problem of religious education is pedagogical in character and need not be noticed in this journal.

IRVING KING.

STATE UNIVERSITY OF IOWA.

*Notes of the Recent Census of Religious Bodies.* GEORGE A. COE.

The American Journal of Sociology, May, 1910, pp. 806-816.

This census covers the period from 1890 to 1906. Twelve denominations, half of them communistic, have disappeared. Fifty-three new bodies appear, 13 being due to divisions within denominations, 11 coming with immigration, and 29 being new. Independent organizations have increased from 155 to 1,079. The membership of religious bodies has increased faster than the population. The population increased 34 per cent., the Catholics 93.5 per cent., and Protestants 45 per cent. There is now a minister for every 139 members of churches. It was one to every 141 in 1890. There were then 154 churches for every 100 ministers; now there are 134. There are 49,167 more Protestant churches than ministers. "It is evident that denominational zeal has produced a vast amount of unworkable social machinery, and that the only possible relief from the present embarrassment lies in the direction of an actual reduction in the number of local churches." The average membership of the local churches is 104 and the average investment per member is \$49, which may be regarded as "enormous economic waste and corresponding loss of possible social efficiency."

E. S. AMES.

UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO.

*A Contribution to the Sociology of Sects.* JOHN GILLIN. The

American Journal of Sociology, September, 1910, pp. 236-252.

Historic precedent and great personalities have been important

factors in developing sects, but back of these is the matrix of the social body. "They are precipitations resulting from social conflicts, tolerations, and imitations." Their appearance and decay are dependent upon the social conditions amid which they are set. The economic conditions are important. Religious revolt is characteristic of times when certain individuals are freed from ceaseless toil. Political changes are also significant. Sects originate generally in the lower classes which have been shut out from any part in the socializing process. Intellectual unrest is influential, as in the Protestant revolt. The most important factor, however, is the heterogeneity of the population, giving rise to class consciousness and various group organizations. Already the unifying tendency of American life is halting on account of a growing diversity in economic and social conditions.

E. S. AMES.

UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO.

A change has been made in the conduct of the *Zeitschrift für Religionspsychologie* which is significant. With the beginning of Volume IV. Dr. Otto Klemm, of Leipsic, a former pupil of Wundt, has been made a co-editor and will represent the method and standpoint of *Völkerpsychologie*. Dr. Klemm's introductory statement (Vol. IV., 1910, pp. 2-9) makes clear what this means. The older discipline of the Philosophy of Religion had indeed its psychological implications, as in Schleiermacher's emphasis on feeling or Hegel's on *Vorstellung* and in the following tendencies of Voluntarism and Intellectualism. These however did not get beyond individual psychology. Nor does James in his *Varieties of Religious Experience* present a religious psychology in the proper sense, for he deals only with certain aspects of religious phenomena, and those not necessarily the most important. Moreover the pragmatic doctrine of the 'utility' of religion moves in the same sphere as the prudent reflections of eighteenth century rationalism.

The deeper reason for the inadequacy of individual psychology is that the individual in his religious experience meets us not as isolated but as presupposing a definite religious form. The origin of 'forms' of religion is the more general problem. From this it follows unquestionably that only the method of social psychology (*Völkerpsychologie*) can do justice to the problem.

C. BREYFOGLE.

UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO.

## BOOKS RECEIVED DURING NOVEMBER.

- The Evolution of Mind.* JOSEPH McCABE. London: Adam & Black, 1910. Pp. vii + 287. \$2 net.
- Esquisse d'une science pédagogique: les faits et les lois de l'éducation.* LUCIEN CELLÉRIER. Paris: Alcan, 1910. Pp. vii + 393.
- Sociology and Modern Social Problems.* CHARLES A. ELLWOOD. New York: American Book Co., 1910. Pp. 331.
- Pragmatism and its Critics.* ADDISON WEBSTER MOORE. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1910. Pp. vii + 283.
- The Corsican: A Diary of Napoleon's Life in His Own Words.* Preface by R. M. JOHNSTON. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1910. Pp. v + 526. \$1.75 net.
- The Process of Abstraction: An Experimental Study.* THOMAS VERNER MOORE. Berkeley: The University Press, 1910. Pp. 122.
- How We Think.* JOHN DEWEY. Boston: Heath & Co., 1910. Pp. iii + 224.
- Bureau of American Ethnology, Bulletin 37: Antiquities of Central and Southeastern Missouri.* GERALD FOWKE. Washington: Gov. Printing Office, 1910. Pp. iii + 116. *Bulletin 45: Chippewa Music.* FRANCIS DENSMORE. 1910. Pp. iii + 216.
- The Reasoning Ability of Children of the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth School Grades.* FREDERICK G. BONSER. New York: Teachers College, Columbia University, 1910. Pp. vi + 133. \$1.50.
- Psychologie der Raumwahrnehmung des Auges.* STEPHEN WITASEK. Heidelberg: Winter, 1910. Pp. vi + 454.
- Psychologie du vice infantile.* WILLIAM VAN BRABANT. Paris: Alcan, 1910. Pp. 177. Fr. 3. 50.
- Fénelon et l'éducation attrayante.* GABRIEL COMPAYRÉ. Paris: Delaplane, 1910. Pp. 105. Fr. 0.90.
- La Psychologie de l'Attention.* N. VASCHIDE & RAYMOND MEUNIER. Paris: Bloud et Cie, 1910. Pp. 6 + 198. Fr. 3.

## NOTES AND NEWS.

A CIRCULAR has been received announcing the publication, beginning with January next, of a *Journal of Animal Behavior* and an Animal Behavior Monograph Series. The *Journal* will be published bi-monthly and the Monographs will appear at irregular intervals. The following specialists constitute the editorial board: Professor I. Madison Bentley, of Cornell University; Professor Harvey A. Carr, of the University of Chicago; Professor Samuel J. Holmes, of the University of Wisconsin; Professor Herbert S. Jennings, of the Johns Hopkins University; Professor Edward L. Thorndike, of Teachers College, Columbia University; Professor Margaret F. Washburn, of Vassar College (special editor of reviews); Professor John B. Watson, of the Johns Hopkins University (special editor of the Monograph Series); Professor William M. Wheeler, of Harvard University; and Professor Robert M. Yerkes, of Harvard University (managing editor of the *Journal*). The *Journal of Animal Behavior* will accept for publication field studies of the habits, instincts, social relations, etc., of animals, as well as laboratory studies of animal behavior or animal psychology. It is hoped that the organ may serve to bring into more sympathetic and mutually helpful relations the 'naturalists' and the 'experimentalists' of America, that it may encourage the publication of many carefully made naturalistic observations which at present are not published, and that it may present to a wide circle of nature-loving readers accurate accounts of the lives of animals. The subscription price will be \$3.00 per volume. All business communications should be addressed to The Journal of Animal Behavior, Cambridge, Mass.

A CONGRESS, officially known as the 'First Universal Races Congress,' will be held at the University of London, July 26-29, 1911. The avowed object of the Congress is "to discuss, in the light of modern knowledge and the modern conscience, the general relations subsisting between the peoples of the West and those of the East, between so-called white and so-called colored peoples, with a view to encouraging between them a fuller understanding, the most friendly feelings, and a heartier coöperation." The list of the General Committee representing the United States of America includes the names of upwards of 180 persons interested, professionally or otherwise, in the fields of anthropology, history, philosophy, psychology, and sociology.

DR. F. LYMAN WELLS, formerly assistant in pathological psychology in the McLean Hospital, has entered upon the duties of assistant in experimental psychology in the Psychiatric Institute of the New York State Hospitals, and lecturer in psychology in Columbia University.

ON account of ill health Professor Wesley Mills has resigned his position at McGill University and has taken up his residence in England.

THE American Philosophical Association and the Department of Philosophy of Princeton University will cordially welcome any eastern members of the American Psychological Association who are unable to go to Minneapolis and who may care to attend the meetings at Princeton. The sessions cover the dates Dec. 27-29.

THE present number of the BULLETIN, dealing especially with social psychology, has been prepared under the editorial care of Professor J. H. Tufts.

THE following item is taken from the press: Among the courses of Lowell lectures announced for the present season are eight lectures by Edward Bradford Titchener, Sage professor of psychology in the Graduate School of Cornell University, on 'The Structure of Mind'; and eight lectures by Franz Boas, professor of anthropology in Columbia University, on 'Cultural Development and Race.'

# INDEX OF NAMES.

Names of contributors are printed in SMALL CAPITALS, and the page numbers of the contributions in Full Face Type. In the case of authors reviewed the page numbers are in *Italics* and in the case of mention in the notes they are in Roman Type.

Acher, R. A., 241  
 Adams, H. F., 148  
 ADKINS, W. S., 231, 235, 247, 317  
 Alechsieff, N., 213  
 ALLISON, E. N., 234  
 AMES, E. S., 414, 414, 422, 423  
 Angell, J. R., 147  
 ANGLIER, R. P., 388  
 ARNOLD, F., 60  
  
 Bagley, W. C., 36  
 BAIRD, J. W., 36, 215, 219, 251  
 BAKER, R. P., 245  
 Bakewell, C. M., 36  
 Baldwin, B. T., 364  
 Baldwin, J. M., 76, 108, 251, 396  
 Bancel, L. des, 388  
 BARNES, J. C., 67  
 BAWDEN, H. H., 221  
 Beaunis, H., 239  
 Becher, E., 388  
 BENTLEY, I. M., 264  
 Berger, H., 314  
 Bergson, H., 307  
 Bergström, J. A., 147  
 Berry, C. S., 317  
 Betts, G. H., 351  
 BILLINGS, M. L., 145  
 Binet, A., 29  
 Bingham, W. V. D., 220  
 BLISS, C. B., 54  
 BLOOMFIELD, D., 253  
 Boas, F., 362  
 Bolton, T. L., 240  
 Bowne, B. P., 180  
 Breed, F. S., 148, 220  
 Britan, H. H., 26  
 BROWN, W., 29  
 Breyfogle, C., 423  
 BUCHNER, E. F., 1, 36, 65  
 Bullough, E., 234  
 BURNHAM, W. H., 49  
 BURNETT, C. T., 64  
 Burt, C., 352  
  
 CALKINS, M. W., 293, 303, 306, 312, 384  
 CAMERON, E. H., 148, 158, 159, 168, 383  
 Claparède, 145, 157

Coe, George A., 422  
 COLE, L. W., 46, 252  
 COLVIN, S. S., 58  
 COOK, H. D., 42  
 Coriat, I. H., 106, 309, 310  
 Crawley, A. E., 354  
 Creighton, J. H., 252  
 Cushing, H., 144  
  
 DAVIES, A. E., 226  
 Davis, N. K., 252  
 Dawson, G. E., 421  
 DEARBORN, G. V. N., 53  
 DEARBORN, W. F., 56  
 Dewey, J., 75  
 Dixon, R. B., 75  
 DODGE, R., 390  
 DOWNEY, J. E., 162, 165, 319  
 DUNLAP, K., 40, 174, 324, 394  
  
 Ellis, A. C., 36  
 EMERSON, L. E., 27  
  
 FERNALD, M. R., 88  
 FERNBERGER, S. W., 209, 364  
 FERRE, C. E., 62  
 FRANZ, S. I., 36, 66, 75  
 FROST, E., 220, 241, 243  
 FULLER, W. D., 241  
  
 GAMBLE, E. A. McC., 386, 387, 388  
 Gard, W. L., 310  
 Gibbs, D., 30  
 Gillin, John, 422  
 GOLDENWEISER, A. A., 358  
 GOLDSTEIN, K., 315  
 Gordon, K., 229  
 Grasserie, R. de la, 28  
 Groos, K., 75  
  
 Haenel, H., 246  
 HAGGERTY, M. E., 49  
 Haldane, R. B., 317  
 HAYES, S. P., 51  
 HENKE, F. G., 413  
 HENMON, V. A. C., 148, 375  
 HILL, D. S. and MRS., 77  
 HILL, D. S., 36, 66  
 Hocart, A. N., 103  
 Holmes, A., 364

HUBBARD, J. C., 196

HYLAN, J. P., 59

Jacoby, G., 301

James, W., 324

Jastrow, J., 108

Joachim, H., 303

JOHNSTON, C. H., 106, 180

JONES, E., 45, 109, 353, 377

Jones, Mrs. M. S., 75

Jones, R. M., 418

KEEN, J. H., 317

Kent, G. H., 349

KING, I., 154, 157, 298, 420, 422

KIRKPATRICK, E. A., 154, 161, 249

Kleist, K., 133

Koffka, K., 100

KUNKEL, O., 30

LANGFELD, H. S., 100, 200, 247

LAURÉ, M. J., 246

LEFEVRE, A., 73

Legowski, L. W., 24

Lemaitre, A., 158

LEUBA, J. H., 107, 298, 307, 309

Lévy-Bruhl, L., 358

LOUGH, J. E., 56

LOVEJOY, A. O., 36, 220, 354

LUNDDE, E. C., 104

LYNCH, H. A., 309

MACLENNAN, S. F., 418

Marie, A., 141

Martin, L., 311

Marvin, W. T., 180

MAST, S. O., 267

McCOMAS, H. C., 237, 239

McDougall, W., 103

MEAD, G. H., 52, 397

Meumann, E., 148, 241

MEYER, A., 129, 133, 141, 144, 148

Meyer, M., 364

MEYER, S., 243

Miller, I. E., 96

Mills, W., 426

MINER, J. B., 55, 96

Minor, A., 247

Mondolfo, R., 237

MOORE, A. W., 252, 301

Morgan, C. L., 252

MORSE, J., 71

Müller-Freienfels, R., 235

Münsterberg, H., 147, 233, 396

Murray, E., 389

Myers, C. S., 101, 219

NORTON, W. W., 55

Offner, M., 316

OGDEN, R. M., 36, 70, 148, 229, 230

O'Shea, M. V., 36, 161

Partridge, G. E., 348

Payne, B. R., 36

Pearce, H. J., 36

PETERSON, J., 169

PIERCE, A. H., 36, 37, 148

Piéron, H., 307

Pikler, J., 303, 305, 313

PILLSBURY, W. B., 36, 41, 364, 384

Pistolesi, G., 312

Plateau, F., 309

PORTER, J. P., 61

Pozděna, R. F., 245

Prince, M., 75

PUTNAM, J. J., 44

Pyle, W. H., 364

Rand, B., 226

Read, C., 306

REED, H. B., 413

Reinhold, F., 349, 387

Renauld, Fräulein von, 104

RICHARDSON, E. E., 72

RICHARDSON, F., 48, 147

RICHTER, J. C., 101, 103

Rieger, C., 129

Rosanoff, A. J., 349

Rowe, S. H., 159

Ruger, H. A., 348, 353

Russell, L. J., 27

Sabine, G. H., 252

Saling, G., 107, 349

Sanford, E. C., 36

Schlick, M., 231

Schmidt, F., 230

Schneider, K. C., 264

SCHREIBER, G. R., 101

SCOTT, W. D., 50, 369

SEASHORE, C. E., 104, 108, 147

Sedgwick, J. P., 147

Sharp, F. C., 26

SHEPARD, B. B., 311

SHEPARD, J. F., 213, 310, 315

SHEPHERD, O. L., 307

SHEPHERD, W. T., 68

SIDIS, B., 42, 45, 75, 321

Simon, T., 29

SMITH, T. L., 57

SMITH, W., 84

Spaulding, E. G., 36

Spindler und Hoyer, 104

STARCH, D., 20, 352

Stein, P., 168

Stern, W., 349

STOOPS, J. D., 147, 177

STRATTON, G. M., 43

Sutherland, A. H., 75

SWIFT, E. J., 17, 149

Sybel, A. von, 386

TAFT, J. J., 107

Thorndike, R. L., 180, 342  
TITCHENER, E. B., 31, 36, 173  
Truschel, L., 103  
TURNER, C. H., 280  
TUFTS, J. H., 147, 412, 426

Urban, F. M., 209, 364  
URBAN, W. M., 372

Vaschide, 162

Wallin, J. E. W., 324  
WARREN, H. C., 51  
WASHBURN, M. F., 288, 324  
WAUGH, K. T., 240  
WEATHERLY, U. G., 412  
WEICHSKI, J., 167, 228, 233  
WEISS, A. P., 24, 26, 303, 305, 313

WELLS, F. L., 44, 362, 378, 426  
WELLS, N. A., 181  
WHIPPLE, G. M., 34, 346, 365  
Wilde, N., 228  
Williams, M. C., 324  
WILLIAMS, T. A., 69  
Wilson, H. A., 101  
Winch, W. H., 314  
Witasek, S., 246  
Woodrow, H. H., 147  
WOODWORTH, R. S., 325, 342, 346, 348  
349, 351, 364  
WOOLLEY, H. T., 335, 396  
Wreschner, A., 215  
YERKES, R. M., 48, 253, 317  
YOAKUM, C. S., 246, 310, 314, 316

# INDEX OF SUBJECTS.

- Abnormal Psychology, 46, 60, 129 ff., 133, 141, 145
- Æsthetics, 24, 229 ff., 230 ff.
- Affection, 181, 213
- Anesthesia and Consciousness, 77
- Anthropology, 362
- Apparatus, 104
- Association, 167, 215, 349; Memory and, 386
- Associations, Meetings of, 37, 65
- Attention, 41, 53, 64
- Behavior, Animal, 267 ff.
- Brain, Functions of, 66, 129, 144
- Brightness, Saturation and, 247
- Calkins' Psychology, 384
- Child Psychology, 157, 161, 241
- Color Vocabularies, 325
- Combination Tones, 169 ff.
- Comedy, 84
- Comic, Comedy and the, 84
- Comparative Psychology, 30, 46 ff., 61, 68, 253, 264, 267, 280, 288
- Complication Phenomena, 40
- Consciousness, 77, 240, 303; and Evolution, 177
- Control, Voluntary, 67
- Dementia Præcox, 44
- Development, Social, 161
- Dextrality, 377
- Difference Tones, 31
- Discriminative Sensitivity, 56
- Dreams, 45, 241
- Dynamic Psychology, 305
- Educational Psychology, 342, 346
- Emotion, 54, 106, 310
- Ethics, 26, 226, 228
- Evolution, in Greek Thought, 73
- Experimental Psychology, 181, 196, 200, 209 ff., 219
- Fatigue, 316, 378
- Feeling, 181, 213
- Freud's Psychology, 109
- Galvanic Phenomena, 42, 174, 321, 394
- Genetic Psychology, 154 ff., 249
- Graphic Functions, 319
- Habit, 159
- Hand, Psychology of the, 162
- Handwriting, 165
- Hearing, 31, 55, 96, 101 ff., 169 ff.
- Hamlet's Mystery, 353
- Hysteria, 145
- Illusions, Tactual, 42; Visual, 390
- Imagery, 58, 88, 235 ff., 351; Percepts and, 306
- Imitation, 312
- Individual Psychology, 235 ff., 348 f.
- Instinct, 253
- Intelligence, General, 352
- Introspection, 239
- Language, 28
- 'Laws of Nature,' Concept of, 72
- Learning, 17, 20, 149
- Logic, 317
- Meaning, 70, 397
- Memory, 307 ff., 386
- Mental Diagnosis, 317
- Mind, as a Category of Science, 221
- Motor Ideation, 58
- Movement, Disturbances of, 133
- Neurasthenia, 69
- Organic Sensations, 388
- Percepts and Images, 306
- Pragmatism, 301
- Prejudice, 71
- Proceedings of Meetings, 37, 65
- Progress in Psychology, 1
- Psychical Process, 303
- Psychology, Abnormal, 46, 60, 129, 133, 141, 145; Child, 56, 157, 161, 241; Comparative, 30, 46 ff., 61, 68, 253 ff.; Dynamic, 305; Educational, 342, 346; Experimental, 181, 196, 200, 209 ff., 219; Freud's, 109; Genetic, 154 ff., 249; Individual, 235, 348 ff.; Intensive Teaching of, 59; Progress in, 1; Race, 358; of Religion, 414; Sex, 335; Social, 52, 397, 406
- Psychopathology, 141
- Psychophysics, 209
- Pulse and Emotion, 106
- Race Psychology, 358
- Reaction Time, 375

- Reading, 56, 383
- Religion, 107, 298, 414 ff.
- Reproduction, 215
- Retardation, 60
- Rhythm, 100
- Right-handedness, 377
- Saturation and Brightness, 247
- Shame, 57
- Sex, Psychology of, 335
- Social Psychology, 52, 397, 406 ff.
- Soul, 354
- Sound, Localization of, 101 ff.
- Space, Conception of, 27; Perception of, 101 ff., 245 ff.
- Sympathy, 104
- Suggestibility, 50
- Suggestion, 311, 369
- Suppression, 200
- Tactual Illusion, 42
- Taste Sensations, 388
- Telegraphing, 149
- Testimony, 34, 365
- Tests, 66, 346, 352
- Thinking, Psychology of, 96
- Thought Processes, 293
- Tones, Combination, 169 ff., Difference, 31
- Touch, 66
- Unconsciousness, 44
- Values, 372
- Vision, 43, 51, 62, 196, 245 ff., 390
- Volition, 313 ff.



Vol. VII, No. 12

PSYCHOLOGICAL REVIEW PUBLICATIONS

December 15, 1910

THE  
Psychological Bulletin

EDITED BY

ARTHUR H. PIERCE, SMITH COLLEGE  
HOWARD C. WARREN, PRINCETON UNIVERSITY (*Index*)  
JOHN B. WATSON, JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY (*Review*) AND  
JAMES R. ANGELL, UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO (*Monographs*)

WITH THE CO-OPERATION OF

J. W. BAIRD, CLARK UNIVERSITY; MADISON BENTLEY, CORNELL UNIVERSITY; E. F. BUCHNER, JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY; H. A. CARR, UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO; KNIGHT DUNLAP, JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY; E. B. HOLT, HARVARD UNIVERSITY; J. H. LEUBA, BRYN MAWR COLLEGE; MAX MEYER, UNIVERSITY OF MISSOURI; ROBERT MACDOUGALL, NEW YORK UNIVERSITY; R. M. OGDEN, UNIVERSITY OF TENNESSEE; W. D. SCOTT, NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY; E. J. SWIFT, WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY; J. H. TUFTS, UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO; M. F. WASHBURN, VASSAR COLLEGE; R. S. WOODWORTH, COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

SOCIAL AND RELIGIOUS PSYCHOLOGY NUMBER.

EDITED BY J. H. TUFTS

CONTENTS

*Social Consciousness and the Consciousness of Meaning*: G. H. MEAD, 397.

*Psychological Literature*:

*Social Psychology* (Field, Coit, McConnell, Nordan, de Lanessan, Novicow, de la Grasserie, Frick, Shotwell, Weatherly, Henke): J. H. T., H. B. REED, E. S. AMES, 406. *Religious Psychology* (James, Jones, Dawson, Coe, Gillin, Klemm): S. F. MACLENNAN, IRVING KING, E. S. AMES, C. B. BROWN, 414.

*Books Received*, 424; *Notes and News*, 425; *Index*, 427.

PUBLISHED MONTHLY BY

THE REVIEW PUBLISHING COMPANY

41 NORTH QUEEN ST., LANCASTER, PA.,

AND BALTIMORE, MD.

AGENTS: G. E. STECHERT & CO., LONDON (2 Star Yard, Carey St., W. C.);  
LEIPZIG (Hospital St., 10); PARIS (76 rue de Rennes)

Entered as second-class matter January 21, 1904, at the post-office at Lancaster, Pa., under  
Act of Congress of March 3, 1879

# Psychological Review Publications

EDITED BY

HOWARD C. WARREN, PRINCETON UNIVERSITY (*Index*).  
JOHN B. WATSON, JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY (*Review*).  
JAMES R. ANGELL, UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO (*Monographs*).  
ARTHUR H. PIERCE, SMITH COLLEGE (*Bulletin*).

WITH THE CO-OPERATION OF  
MANY DISTINGUISHED PSYCHOLOGISTS

## THE PSYCHOLOGICAL REVIEW

containing original contributions only, appears bimonthly, on the first of January, March, May, July, September, and November, the six numbers comprising a volume of about 420 pages.

## THE PSYCHOLOGICAL BULLETIN

containing critical reviews, notices of books and articles, psychological news and notes, university notices, announcements, and shorter discussions, appears the fifteenth of each month, the annual volume comprising about 420 pages. Special issues of the BULLETIN consist of general reviews of recent work in some department of psychology, with original contributions bearing on the same topic.

## THE PSYCHOLOGICAL INDEX

is a compendious bibliography of books, monographs, and articles upon psychological and cognate topics that have appeared during the year. The INDEX is issued in April or May, and may be subscribed for in connection with The REVIEW and BULLETIN, or purchased separately.

**Annual Subscription to Review and Bulletin, \$4.50 (Canada, \$4.65, Postal Union, \$4.80); Review, Bulletin, and Index, \$5.35 (Canada, \$5.50, Postal Union, \$5.65); Bulletin, Alone, \$2.50 (Canada, \$2.60, Postal Union, \$2.70).**

**Current Numbers of the Review, 500.; of the Bulletin, 250. (special issues 400.); of the Index, \$1.**

## THE PSYCHOLOGICAL MONOGRAPHS

consist of longer researches or treatises or collections of laboratory studies which it is important to publish promptly and as units. THE PHILOSOPHICAL MONOGRAPHS form a separate series, containing treatises more philosophical in character. The MONOGRAPHS appear at irregular intervals and are gathered into volumes of about 500 pages, with a uniform subscription price of \$4.00. (Postal Union \$4.30.) Each series may be subscribed for separately.

The price of single numbers varies according to their size (see list). Twelve volumes of the PSYCHOLOGICAL MONOGRAPHS have been issued, and the first volume of the PHILOSOPHICAL MONOGRAPHS is in progress.

## LIBRARY OF GENETIC SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY

A series of bound books issued as accepted for publication. The price varies according to the size of the volume. Two volumes of the Library have already appeared.

Subscriptions, orders, and business communications may be sent direct to the Business Manager of the PSYCHOLOGICAL REVIEW, Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, Md., or forwarded through the publishers or agents.

PUBLISHED BY

THE REVIEW PUBLISHING CO.,  
41 NORTH QUEEN ST., LANCASTER, PA.  
AND BALTIMORE, MD.

AGENT G. E. STECHERT & CO., London (2 Star Yard, Carey St., W. C.);  
Leipzig (Hospital St., 10), Paris (76 rue de Rennes).

# Princeton University

## DEPARTMENT OF PHILOSOPHY

1910-1911

### Graduate Courses in Philosophy and Psychology

Critical and Historical Survey of the General Trend of Philosophical and Scientific Thought. Lectures with collateral reading. Professor Hibben.

The Philosophy of Kant. Both terms (3). Professor Norman Smith.

Experimental Psychology. Advanced laboratory course, with weekly conference. Both terms (3). Professor Warren.

Seminary in General Philosophy. Topic chosen in view of the wants of the student. Conducted by reading, theses, and discussions. Both terms. Professor Ormond.

Psychological Seminary. Topic determined in consultation with class. Both terms. Professor Warren or Professor Norman Smith.

Theory of Mental Measurements. First term (3). Professor Warren.

Readings in German Philosophy. Both terms (3). Professor Hibben.

Hedonism and the Ethics of Naturalism. First term (3). Professor G. S. Patton.

Self-realization and the Ethics of Idealism. Second term (3). Professor G. S. Patton.

History of English Ethics. First term (3). (Given 1909-10.) Professor G. S. Patton.

Problems in Contemporary Ethics. Second term (3). Professor G. S. Patton.

The Philosophy of Evolution. Both terms (3). Professor Spaulding.

Schopenhauer and Nietzsche. Second term (3). Dr. Fogel.

Masterpieces of Modern Philosophy. First term (3). Professor Ormond.

For courses in cognate subjects, regulations respecting degrees, etc., see the University Catalogue or special pamphlet containing the official Announcement of the Department of Philosophy.

Enquiries may be addressed to any of the professors in the Department, or to  
DEAN ANDREW F. WEST, Princeton, N. J.

# The Johns Hopkins University

Baltimore, Maryland

---

## GRADUATE COURSES IN PHILOSOPHY, PSYCHOLOGY AND EDUCATION 1910—1911

---

**Historical Courses** :—Continental Philosophy from Des Cartes to Kant, E. H. GRIFFIN ; English Ethics of the last Half-Century, E. H. GRIFFIN ; Modern Pantheism and Pessimism (Schopenhauer), E. F. BUCHNER.

**Philosophy** :—Readings in German Philosophy, E. F. BUCHNER ; The Conception of Evolution, A. O. LOVEJOY ; Systematic Ethical Theory, A. O. LOVEJOY.

**Psychology** :—Advanced General Psychology, J. B. WATSON ; Experimental Psychology (research), J. B. WATSON and K. DUNLAP ; Comparative Psychology (research), J. B. WATSON ; Introduction to Comparative Psychology, J. B. WATSON ; Introduction to Experimental Psychology, K. DUNLAP ; Attention and Feeling from the Experimental Point of View, K. DUNLAP.

**Education** :—Philosophy of Education, E. F. BUCHNER ; Educational Psychology, E. F. BUCHNER.

**The Graduate Conference** meets fortnightly. Papers and reports on researches are presented by all members of the department. **The Psychological Journal Club** meets weekly. **The Philosophical Seminary** is reserved for the use of students and contains the **Library** of the department, including the journals of the different subjects. **The Psychological Laboratory** is especially equipped for instruction and for research in both human and comparative psychology.

For further information, address

**Professor Edward F. Buchner, Secretary**

# UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

## DEPARTMENTS OF PSYCHOLOGY AND PHILOSOPHY

---

### PSYCHOLOGY

The department offers *introductory courses* in general psychology, experimental psychology (both qualitative and quantitative), comparative psychology (theoretical and practical), educational psychology, genetic psychology, folk psychology and the psychology of religion. The departments of neurology and physiology afford training courses of peculiar value to students specializing in either experimental or comparative psychology.

*Advanced courses* provide opportunity for research work in the various branches of psychology and also deal with such special subjects as the history of psychological theory, the relations of psychology to philosophy, the methodology of psychology, etc. A Journal Club enables students to keep abreast of the current literature.

### PHILOSOPHY

Courses are offered in the general history of philosophy, history and theory of science, history of moral and social philosophy, Greek philosophy, Kant, Hegel, and other modern authors, the history of logic including recent logical theories, recent metaphysics including Pragmatism, the origins of morality, psychology of ethics, social ethics, political ethics, æsthetics. The departments of Education, Sociology, Economics, Political Science, Comparative Religion, and Greek provide related courses.

---

### EDUCATION

A Graduate Department of Education has been organized in the School of Education. Courses of advanced grade will be given in History of Education, Educational Administration, Educational Psychology, Educational Methods and in special subjects such as Manual Training, Nature Study, History, Mathematics, etc., etc. Laboratory facilities for experiments on educational subjects are provided and an elementary and high school furnish opportunity for observation and experiments.

### CORPS OF INSTRUCTORS

JAMES R. ANGELL  
GEORGE H. MEAD  
EDWARD S. AMES  
HARVEY CARR  
FRANK N. FREEMAN  
JOSEPH W. HAYES

JAMES H. TUFTS  
ADDISON W. MOORE  
W. F. DEARBORN  
W. C. GORE  
J. F. SCOTT

CHARLES H. JUDD  
NATHANIEL BUTLER  
WALTER SARGENT  
S. C. PARKER  
FRANK M. LEAVITT  
J. F. BOBBITT

Attention is invited particularly to the work of the summer quarter, which begins June 12th and ends August 28th. For information regarding this and other work of the departments, and also concerning fellowships, address:

**FOR PSYCHOLOGY, PROFESSOR JAMES R. ANGELL**  
**FOR PHILOSOPHY, PROFESSOR JAMES H. TUFTS**  
**FOR EDUCATION, PROFESSOR CHARLES H. JUDD**

*Volume I of the Library of Genetic Science and Philosophy*

## **THE MORAL LIFE**

---

**A Study in Genetic Ethics**

By

**ARTHUR ERNEST DAVIES, Ph.D.**

*Professor of Philosophy in Ohio State University.*

xlv+188 pages. 8vo. Cloth. Price \$2.00 net. Postage 10 cents.

It is, as the sub-title indicates, a study in Genetic Ethics. In the first two chapters the author defines the genetic problem and method in their relation to other views and methods. The main subjects of the discussion—the moral ideal, the moral self, moral motive, and moral freedom—are then taken up. The author's formulation of these problems makes of genetic ethics a special branch of ethical inquiry; and in the development of his answers it is shown how really important have been the historical views for our understanding of the moral life. A distinctive feature of the work is the large space—three chapters—given to the discussion of motive; and the chapter on freedom is an attempt to include within the author's outline the truths of both indeterminism and determinism. The book is written with the class-room in view, and will be found adapted to courses in advanced ethics.

---

*Volume II of the Library of Genetic Science and Philosophy*

## **Darwin and the Humanities**

By

**JAMES MARK BALDWIN**

vii+118 pages. 8vo. Cloth. Price \$1.50 net. Postage .08 cents.

An account of what psychologists and moralists have done to assimilate and apply evolution theory in the Mental and Social Sciences, and in Philosophy. The book contains chapters on Darwinism in relation to Psychology, Social Science, Ethics, Logic, Philosophy and Religion.

Orders and remittances for the above should be sent to

**BUSINESS MANAGER, REVIEW PUBLISHING CO.,**

Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, Maryland.

## THE METAPHYSIC OF EXPERIENCE

By SHADWORTH H. HODGSON

### IN FOUR PARTS

Book I. General Analysis of Experience.

Book II. Positive Science.

Book III. Analysis of Conscious Action.

Book IV. The Real Universe.

In four vols., 8vo, buckram (the vols. not to be had separately).

Price, \$12.00 net.

### BY THE SAME AUTHOR

TIME AND PLACE. A Metaphysical Essay. 8vo. \$5.75. 1865.

THE THEORY OF PRACTICE. An Ethical Enquiry. 2 vols. 8vo. \$8.75. 1870.

THE PHILOSOPHY OF REFLECTION. 2 vols. 8vo, \$7.50. 1878.

OUTCAST ESSAYS AND VERSE TRANSLATIONS.

*Essays*—The Genius of De Quincey, and De Quincey as Political Economist

—The Supernatural in English Poetry, with Note on the True Symbol of Christian Union—English Verse.

*Verse Translations*—Nineteen short passages, mostly familiar, from Greek and Latin Classic poets. Crown 8vo. 1881.

LONGMANS, GREEN & CO.

Fourth Ave. and 30th St.  
NEW YORK

LON ON, BOMBAY AND CALCUTTA

LIBRAIRIE KÜNDIG, 11 Corraterie, GENÈVE

## Archives de Psychologie

PUBLIÉES PAR

Th. Flournoy

D<sup>r</sup> en médecine.

Ed. Claparède

D<sup>r</sup> en médecine

Professeurs de Psychologie expérimentale à l'Université de Genève.

Abonnement : 15 Fr. par volume

(4 fascicules forment un volume d'au moins 400 pages.)

Il paraît un volume environ par an.

Chaque fascicule contient : des *Mémoires originaux*, un *Recueil de faits* (*documents et discussions*), des *Notices ou revues bibliographiques* des *Notes diverses* (annonces de Congrès, etc.).

Collection des 8 volumes déjà parus

brochés : 98 fr. (frais de port compris)

# THE BRITISH JOURNAL OF PSYCHOLOGY

EDITED BY

JAMES WARD AND W. H. R. RIVERS

with the collaboration of

A. Kirschmann, W. McDougall, C. S. Myers, A. F. Shand,  
C. S. Sherrington, W. G. Smith, C. Spearman.

Contents of Vol. III, Part 3, October, 1910. Price, 6s net.

- MYERS, CHARLES S. Instinct and Intelligence.  
MORGAN, C. LLOYD. Instinct and Intelligence.  
CARR, H. WILDON. Instinct and Intelligence.  
STOUT, G. F. Instinct and Intelligence.  
MCDUGALL, WILLIAM. Instinct and Intelligence.  
MYERS, CHARLES S. Instinct and Intelligence—A Reply.  
SPEARMAN, C. Correlation Calculated from Faulty Data.  
BROWN, WILLIAM. Some Experimental Results in the Correlation of  
Mental Abilities.  
WATT, HENRY J. Some Problems of Sensory Integration (Two Figures)  
Proceedings of the British Psychological Society.

---

The *British Journal of Psychology* is issued in parts at irregular intervals; four parts will (usually) constitute a volume of about 450 pages Royal 8vo.

Volumes I and II (1904-8) now ready. Each volume in Four Parts, paper covers, 15s net. Bound in Buckram, 18s. 6d. net.

The subscription price, payable in advance, is 15s. per volume (post-free); the price of single numbers will depend on the size of each number. Subscriptions may be sent to any Bookseller, or to the Cambridge University Press, Fetter Lane, London, E.C.

# L'ANNÉE PSYCHOLOGIQUE

Publiée par Alfred BINET

AVEC LA COLLABORATION DES

LARGUIER DES BANCELS ET Dr TH. SIMON

ET DE

MM. YUNG, MAIGRE, PLATEAU, RUYSSSEN, STERN

Prix. Quinze francs.

---

## QUINZIÈME ANNÉE

---

### MÉMOIRES ORIGINAUX

AVANT-PROPOS. Le bilan de la psychologie en 1908.

BINET ET SIMON.—L'intelligence des imbéciles.—Le caractère. Dociles et rétifs.—L'attention, sa mobilisation.—L'effort volontaire.—L'écriture.—L'intelligence sensorielle.—Le sens de la douleur.—L'association d'idées.—L'activité d'intelligence, distinguée du niveau.—L'intelligence des nombres.—Le raisonnement.—Suggestibilité par docilité.—Comment un débile a l'esprit faux.—Un schéma de la pensée.

PLATEAU.—Les insectes ont-ils la mémoire des faits ?

JUNG.—L'analyse des rêves.

BINET ET SIMON.—Nouvelle théorie psychologique et clinique de la démence.

LARGUIER DES BANCELS.—Les sensations gustatives.

BINET.—Le mystère de la peinture.

BINET.—La psychologie artistique de Tade Styka.

RUYSSSEN.—Psychologisme et sociologisme.

BINET ET SIMON.—Étude sur l'art d'enseigner la parole aux sourds-muets

### ANALYSES BIBLIOGRAPHIQUES

par MM. Binet, Larguer des Bancel, Maigre, Stern.

Psychologie physiologique, Sensations et mouvements, Perceptions et Illusions, Associations d'idées, Attention, Mémoire et Images, Langage, Sentiments, Sentiments religieux, Esthétique, Psychologie de la pensée, Suggestions, Psychologie individuelle, Enfants et pédagogie, Animaux, Psychologie judiciaire, Pathologie, Traités généraux; Questions de méthode, Questions philosophiques.

PARIS

MASSON ET C<sup>ie</sup>, ÉDITEURS

LIBRAIRES DE L'ACADÉMIE DE MÉDECINE

120, BOULEVARD SAINT-GERMAIN, 120

1909

ix

# RIVISTA ITALIANA DI SOCIOLOGIA

Fondata dai professori A. BOSCO, G. CAVAGLIERI, S. COGNETTI DE MARTIIS,  
G. SERGI, V. TANGORRA, E. TEDESCHI

DIRETTA

da

GUIDO CAVAGLIERI

*prof. par. di dir. amm. e scienza dell'  
amm. nell' Università di Roma*

GIUSEPPE SERGI

*prof. ordinario di antropologia nell'  
Università di Roma*

MAGGIO-AGOSTA 1910

- V. PARETO . . . . . Le azioni non logiche.  
R. MICHELS . . . . . La crisi psicologica del socialismo.  
A. DE PIETRI-TONELLI . . . . . Intorno ad una moderna metodologia delle scienze  
sociali.  
F. SAVORGNA . . . . . Religione e nazionalità nella scelta matrimoniale.

## Rassegne analitiche:

- A. BRUNO . . . . . Spiegazioni delle credenze delle genti primitive.  
A. SOLMI . . . . . L'origine italica della civiltà moderna.  
A. PAGANO . . . . . I massimi problemi della filosofia.

**Rassegna delle pubblicazioni** (*Contenente recensioni, riassunti  
di articoli e annunci di libri e di articoli di riviste*):  
Sociologia generale, Storia e critica delle dottrine  
sociali, Storia delle istituzioni sociali, Storia dell'  
incivilimento, Antropologia ed Etnografia, Demo-  
grafia, Psicologia sociale, Economia sociale, Etica  
sociale, Scienza giuridica, Scienza politica, Sociolo-  
gia criminale, Metodologia delle scienze sociali, Fi-  
losofia e scienza contemporanea, Movimento sociale  
contemporaneo, Questioni odierne di carattere sociale  
o politico (*L'indice nell' interno della copertina*).

**Notizie** (*L'indice nell' interno della copertina*).

PROPRIETÀ LETTERARIA

FRATELLI BOCCA - EDITORI

TORINO-MILANO-ROMA

Direzione e Amministrazione: ROMA, VIA VENTI SETTEMBRE, 8

Abbon. annuo: L. 10 per l' Italia  
Fr. 14 per l' estero

Un fascicolo: L. 2 per l' Italia  
Fr. 2.50 per l' estero

# Psychological Review Publications

## PSYCHOLOGICAL MONOGRAPHS

### VOL. I.

1. *\*On Sensations from Pressure and Impact*; H. GRIFFING. Pp. 88. 2. *Association*; M. W. CALKINS. Pp. vii+56. 75 cents. 3. *\*Mental Development of a Child*; KATHLEEN MOORE. Pp. iv+150. 4. *Kant's Psychology*; E. F. BUCHNER. Pp. viii+208. \$1.50.

### VOL. II.

5. *Problems in the Psychology of Reading*; J. O. QUANTZ. Pp. iv+51. 75 cents. 6. *The Fluctuation of Attention*; J. P. HVLAN. Pp. ii+78. 75 cents. 7. *\*Mental Imagery*; WILFRID LAY. Pp. ii+59. 8. *\*Animal Intelligence*; E. L. THORNDIKE. Pp. ii+109. 9. *The Emotion of Joy*; GEORGE VAN NESS DEARBORN. Pp. ii+70. 10. *\*Conduct and the Weather*; EDWIN G. DEXTER. Pp. viii+105.

### VOL. III.

11. *\*On Inhibition*; B. B. BREESE. Pp. iv+65. 12. *On After-images*; SHEPHERD IVORY FRANZ. Pp. iv+61. \$1.12. 13. *\*The Accuracy of Voluntary Movement*; R. S. WOODWORTH. Pp. vi+114. 14. *A Study of Lapses*; H. HEATH BAWDEN. Pp. iv+122. \$1.50. 15. *The Mental Life of the Monkeys*; E. L. THORNDIKE. Pp. iv+57. 50 cents. 16. *\*The Correlation of Mental and Physical Tests*; C. WISSLER. Pp. iv+62.

### VOL. IV

17. *Harvard Psychological Studies, Vol. I.*; sixteen experimental investigations. Edited by HUGO MÜNSTERBERG. Pp. viii+654. \$3.00.

### VOL. V

18. *Sociability and Sympathy*; J. W. L. JONES. Pp. iv+91. 75 cents. 19. *The Practice Curve*; J. H. BAIR. Pp. 70. 75 cents. 20. *The Psychology of Expectation*; CLARA M. HITCHCOCK. Pp. iv+78. 75 cents. 21. *Motor, Visual and Applied Rhythms*; J. B. MINER. Pp. iv+106. \$1.00. 22. *The Perception of Number*; J. F. MESSENGER. Pp. iv+44. 50 cents. 23. *A Study of Memory for Connected Trains of Thought*; E. N. HENDERSON. Pp. iv+94.

### VOL. VI

24. *A Study in Reaction Time and Movement*; T. V. MOORE. Pp. iv+86. 75 cents. 25. *The Individual and his Relation to Society*; J. H. TUFTS. Pp. iv+58. 50 cents. 26. *Time and Reality*; J. E. BOODIN. Pp. v+119. \$1.00. 27. *The Differentiation of Religious Consciousness*; IRVING KING. Pp. iv+72. 75 cents. 28. *University of Iowa Studies*. No. IV. Edited by C. E. SEASHORE. Pp. v+118. \$1.25.

### VOL. VII

29. *Yale Psychological Studies, New Series, Vol. I.* No. 1. Edited by Charles H. JUDD. Pp. vii+226. \$2.25. 30. *The Theory of Psychical Dispositions*; CHARLES A. DUBRAY. Pp. vii+170. \$1.50. 31. *Visual Illusion of Movement during Eye Closure*. HARVEY CARR. Pp. vi+127. \$1.25.

## VOL. VIII

32. **The Psychological Experiences connected with the Different Parts of Speech.** ELEANOR H. ROWLAND. Pp. 42. 40 cents. 33. **Kinesthetic and Organic Sensations: Their Role in the Reactions of the White Rat to the Maze;** JOHN B. WATSON. Pp. vi+100. \$1.00. 34. **Yale Psychological Studies: New Series. Vol. 1. No. 2.** Edited by CHARLES H. JUDD. Pp. v+197. \$1.75. 35. **Studies from the Psychological Laboratory of Wesleyan University. Vol. I. No. 1. An Experimental Study of Visual Fixation.** RAYMOND DODGE. Pp. vii+95. \$1.00. NOTE—No. 36 appears as No. 1 of the Philosophical Monographs.

## VOL. IX

37. **Studies from the Psychological Laboratory of the University of Chicago. Control Processes in Modified Hand-Writing: An Experimental Study.** JUNE E. DOWNEY. Pp. vii+148. \$1.50. 38. **University of Iowa Studies in Psychology. No. 5.** Edited by CARL E. SEASHORE. Pp. 148. \$1.50. 39. **Studies from the Psychological Laboratory of the University of Chicago. Combination Tones and Other Related Auditory Phenomena.** JOSEPH PETERSON. Pp. xiii+136. \$1.50.

## VOL. X

40. **Studies from the Johns Hopkins Psychological Laboratory.** Edited by G. M. STRATTON. Pp. 104. \$1.00. 41. **The Social Will.** EDWIN ANDREW HAYDEN. Pp. iv+93. \$1.00. 42. **Studies from the Psychological Laboratory of the University of Chicago: The Effect of Achromatic Conditions on the Color Phenomena of Peripheral Vision.** GRACE MAXWELL FERNALD. Pp. iv+91. \$1.00. 43. **Wellesley College Studies in Psychology, No. 1. A Study in Memorizing Various Materials by the Reconstruction Method.** ELEANOR A. MCC. GAMBLE. Pp. xi+211. \$2.25.

## VOL. XI

44. **Studies from the Psychological Laboratory of the University of Illinois, Vol. I., No. 1.** Edited by STEPHEN S. COLVIN. Pp. vi+177. \$1.75. 45. **Ohio State University, Psychological Studies, Vol. I, No. 1;** Edited by THOMAS H. HAINES. Pp. 71. 75 cents. 46. **Studies from Psychological Laboratory of University of Chicago, An Experimental Study of Fatigue.** C. S. YOAKUM. Pp. vi+130. \$1.25. 47. **Studies from the Johns Hopkins Psychological Laboratory. The Determination of the Position of a Momentary Impression in the Temporal Course of a Moving Visual Impression.** N. T. BURROW. Pp. 63. 65 cents.

## VOL. XII

48. **A Study of Sensory Control in the Rat.** FLORENCE RICHARDSON. Pp. 124. \$1.25. 49. **On the Influence of Complexity and Dissimilarity on Memory.** HARVEY A. PETERSON. Pp. 86. \$1.00. 50. **Studies in Melody.** W. VAN DYKE BINGHAM. Pp. vi+88. \$1.00. 51. **Report of the Committee of the American Psychological Association on the Teaching of Psychology.** Pp. 94. \$1.00. 52. **Some Mental Processes of the Rhesus Monkey.** WILLIAM SHEPHERD. (In press.)

## PHILOSOPHICAL MONOGRAPHS

### VOL. I

1. **Aesthetic Experience: Its Nature and Function in Epistemology.** W. D. FURRY. Pp. xvi+160. \$1.60. 2. **The Philosophy of John Norris of Bemerton.** FLORA ISABEL MACKINNON. Pp. iii+103. \$1.00.

\*Monographs so marked are out of print. Vol. IV, \$3.00; later volumes, \$4.00 each.

